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ABSTRACT
In the process of modernizing the North American electric power grid with
the creation of the Smart Grid, thousands of devices called phasor measure-
ment units (PMUs) have been deployed across the U.S. continent to continu-
ously monitor the power grid state in real-time. Each PMU measures voltage
and current phasors at its local substation, then synchronizes these measure-
ments across the continental network using the Global Positioning System
(GPS) as a common timing reference. GPS serves as an excellent timing
source due to its global coverage as well as its precise, sub-microsecond level
timing accuracy. However, because civilian GPS signals are unencrypted
with a publicly available signal structure, any individual with the appropri-
ate equipment can mimic these signals in order to establish a false timing
solution at the PMU sites. This type of attack, commonly known as GPS
spoofing, presents a major concern to our future power grid infrastructure.
Indeed, even minor timing manipulations can cause inaccurate power flow
representations and corresponding corrective measures, potentially inducing
large-scale power disruptions, instability within the power grid, and/or dam-
age to generators and other power equipment.
In this thesis, we present a multi-receiver spoofing detection algorithm
for PMU devices, utilizing a hierarchical architecture framework. For the
received GPS signal at each PMU station, we create conditioned signal frag-
ments containing the military P(Y) GPS signal, which bears a binary spread-
ing code sequence that is unavailable to civilian users and thus cannot be
forged by an attacker. As a result, the military P(Y) signal establishes an
encrypted signature in the background of all authentic GPS signals. The
presence of the authentic signature can be verified, without knowledge of the
precise bit sequence, by correlating amongst conditioned signal fragments
obtained from other PMU sites in a sub-network of cross-check receivers,
thereby leveraging the secure communication network available within the
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power grid infrastructure. We further defend against coordinated spoofing
attacks conducted against the sub-network of PMU devices by comparing
condensed, representative signals generated for each sub-network within the
power grid. Using real-world data recorded during a government-sponsored,
live-sky spoofing event, we demonstrate that our algorithm successfully eval-
uates the authenticity of each receiver in a widely dispersed network.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In Title XIII of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA),
the U.S. government endorsed a new, major effort to modernize the North
American electric power grid with the creation of the Smart Grid [1]. The
EISA officially defined the Smart Grid and described its key elements, in-
cluding the implementation of a wide-area network of measurement devices
to monitor the power grid state. Currently, this feature is largely comprised
of a network of nearly 3000 phasor measurement units (PMUs), devices that
measure voltage and current phasors at critical substations [2], tagging each
with a precise time-stamp using GPS. A map of the widely dispersed PMU
network is shown in Fig. 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Network of PMUs monitoring critical substations [2]
However, security was not a primary design consideration of civilian GPS.
Indeed, the civilian GPS signal is not only weak, with received power lev-
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els on the order of 10−16 Watts, but it is also unencrypted, with a clearly
outlined signal structure in publicly available interface specifications [3]. As
a result, any individual with the right equipment can mimic the authentic
GPS signals and establish a false position and/or timing solution at a victim
receiver [4]. This type of attack, commonly known as GPS spoofing, presents
a major concern to our power grid infrastructure, where even minor timing
manipulations could lead to significant disruptions as discussed in Section
1.1. For the future Smart Grid, this vulnerability could be exploited to in-
duce a false timing solution at one or more critical substations. According to
the IEEE Std. C37.242-2013 [5], the timing accuracy for PMU devices must
be correct to within 26 µs for a 60 Hz system, with a recommended timing
accuracy on the order of 1 µs.
1.1 Susceptibility of PMU Devices to GPS Spoofing
Researchers have investigated the ability to induce false timing solutions in
PMU devices via GPS spoofing [6], as well as the potential resulting effects on
automatic PMU-based power control schemes within the network [7], which
will become increasingly common as the power grid network undergoes mod-
ernization efforts. Indeed, timing inaccuracies significantly greater than the
IEEE C37.118 standard requirement could induce a generator to trip [8]. At
critical substations, the resulting additional load placed on neighboring sta-
tions could induce these generators to trip, potentially resulting in cascading
failures and large-scale blackouts, similar to the Northeastern blackout of
2003 [9]. These outages are not only costly, with an estimated $6 billion for
the Northeastern blackout [10], but can also be harmful to the public and
possibly lethal. In fact, evaluation of the effects of the Northeastern blackout
on New York City show that mortality rates increased by nearly 25% during
August 2003, the month of the power outage [11].
Currently, none of the receivers incorporated within the U.S. power grid
employ even basic protection against spoofing. As a result, all PMU devices
are defenseless to even the simplest spoofing attacks. In this work, we propose
a multi-receiver spoofing detection algorithm using a wide-area, hierarchical
architecture framework. In our solution, each PMU transmits conditioned
GPS signal fragments containing the encrypted military GPS signal, which
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serves as a cryptographic signature present in the background of all authen-
tic GPS signals. We then leverage the available redundancy and geographic
diversity of the receivers in the power grid to compare the received signature
among the network and authenticate each receiver in a coordinated manner.
Finally, to validate our approach, we test our approach using recorded GPS
signals during a government-sponsored, live-sky spoofing event, demonstrat-
ing the ability of our algorithm to successfully evaluate the authenticity of
each receiver in a widely dispersed network.
1.2 Feasibility of GPS Spoofing
Since the invention and initial deployment of GPS, experts in the GNSS com-
munity understood that GPS spoofing was indeed technically possible, but
generally considered it to be too complicated to present a realistic threat,
making the menace largely hypothetical. However, the development of a
portable civilian GPS spoofer and chilling demonstration of a successful at-
tack on a common commercial receiver in 2008 [12] spurred interest from the
GNSS research community. Since this study, interest in the field grew and
GPS/GNSS researchers worldwide subsequently sought to characterize spoof-
ing attacks [13] as well as develop numerous counter-measures and detection
strategies. See Section 1.3 for an overview of proposed spoofing detection
strategies in prior literature.
One may be eager to assuage the sudden concern for GPS spoofing by
rationalizing that the portable spoofer attack demonstration in [12] was con-
ducted by capable experts in the field. However, the threat for GPS spoofing
is becoming more imminent. Programmable GPS signal simulators are read-
ily available for purchase [14], as well as for rent at less than $1k per week
[15]. Additionally, with the development of reprogrammable software de-
fined receivers (SDR), technically capable attackers can design and perform
more advanced spoofing attacks which are synchronized with the authentic
GPS signal, as demonstrated in [12]. Developing the software program to
conduct this type of a spoofing attack certainly requires technical propen-
sity; however, if such a script becomes available online, any individual with
a reprogrammable receiver can download the software from the Internet and
run his or her own spoofing device. In fact, in 2015, software for a GPS sig-
3
nal simulator was publicly posted to GitHub with detailed instructions for
generating a user-dened GPS signal and creating the corresponding radio-
frequency signal via multiple potential SDR platforms [16].
1.3 Proposed GPS Spoofing Detection Strategies in
Prior Literature
Proposed spoofing countermeasures include use of directional antennas to
detect the origin of the incoming signal and comparing these measurements
with the expected azimuth and elevation for each PRN [17, 18, 19]. This
approach is useful for PMUs in the power grid, which have access to satellite
ephemeris data from external sources and can thus immediately verify the
received angle of each satellite PRN signal. However, this approach could
lead to missed detections of spoofing for satellites lower in elevation and is
not immune to spoofing attacks with multiple transmitters.
Angle-of-arrival techniques have also been explored using dual- or multi-
antenna arrays [20] - [21] to detect carrier-phase single differences for dif-
ferent satellite signals. These techniques exploit the fact that the spoofing
signal comes from a single transmission direction, resulting in identical carrier
phase differences between antennas for each signal channel, unlike with the
authentic GPS satellites, which have diverse geometric relationships between
the antenna arrays, resulting in a multiplicity of received carrier phase differ-
ences. However, these angle-of-arrival techniques assume that the spoofing
signal comes from a single source. In the case that the attacker uses separate
transmitters for each spoofed signal, this method can no longer detect the
spoofing attack using the identical received carrier phase single-differences
between channels.
The Vestigial Signal Defense also provides a promising spoofing detection
approach, by monitoring signal distortions in the complex correlation do-
main, induced by the interference between the authentic and spoofed GPS
signal peaks during the onset of an attack [22]. This would be especially
useful for immediate, single-receiver authentication at each station. How-
ever, missed detections could occur if the attacker also broadcasts a nulling
signal to remove the vestige of the authentic signal peak. Indeed, this type
of attack is challenging to execute effectively, for the spoofer must transmit
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a spoofing signal that maintains precise carrier phase alignment with respect
to the authentic signal received by the victim. As a result, to successfully
null the authentic GPS signal, the spoofer requires centimeter-level accurate
knowledge of the victim position, which certainly presents a key challenge
in many navigation applications. However, this challenge becomes easier to
overcome when the target is a permanent, stationary receiver, such as with
receivers within the power grid network.
Techniques for spoofing detection by monitoring the received signal power
from Automatic Gain Control (AGC) measurements have been proposed [23],
in order to detect the increase in received power as a spoofer attempts to
commandeer the receiver tracking loops. However, even a minor power ratio
of 1.1 with the authentic GPS signal can reliably induce the victim receiver
to track the spoofing signal [24]. As a result, such a detector may be overly
sensitive to typical variations in the received signal power caused by solar
and atmospheric effects.
Detection techniques have been examined which utilize both the received
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), called Signal Quality Monitoring (SQM), as well
as the received power [25] to detect a spoofing attack. This technique is
indeed quite promising for a single-receiver, since the SQM and Power Mon-
itoring (PM) spoofing detection tests are complementary in which types of
spoofing attacks can be detected. In particular, for spoofing attacks where
the spoofer utilizes a slight power advantage with respect to the authentic sig-
nal, the PM technique is susceptible to frequent missed detections. However,
the SQM test has the most powerful detection with these types of spoofing
attacks, due to significant asymmetries induced in the cross-correlation func-
tion. Correspondingly, for high-power spoofing attacks, where the spoofer
overpowers the authentic signal, the PM technique readily detects the spoof-
ing attack, whereas the SQM test performs weakly due to limited distortion
of the cross-correlation function caused by the authentic signal peak. How-
ever, similar to VSD, the combined PM and SQM detection approach also
assumes that the spoofer cannot sufficiently null the authentic satellite signal
and rely on its inevitable presence to flag degradations in the received GPS
signal quality.
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1.3.1 Cryptographic Authentication Techniques
Incorporating Cryptographic Authentication in Future GPS Signals
Suggestions have also been made to modify the civilian signal structure by
including an encrypted sequence of bits in the navigation message for au-
thentication [26] - [27] or by using Spread Spectrum Security Codes (SSSCs)
[28] - [29]. An authentication scheme proposed for the L1C signal of the
future GPS III constellation is called Chips-Message Robust Authentication
(Chimera) [30], which authenticates the navigation signal using a hybrid ap-
proach between classical NMA and SSSCs. In particular, via the Chimera
authentication scheme, satellites periodically create a digital signature for the
navigation data message using a private key as well as the navigation message
itself. Users with access to a public key can authenticate the received sig-
nature, but cannot predict the signature beforehand. Chimera additionally
introduces a corresponding signature on the L1C pilot signal, by overriding
or puncturing specific spreading code chips with bit markers, where the bit
marker sequence and marker placement within the spreading code can be
determined and verified by the receiver using the navigation message digital
signature. By signing both the navigation message as well as the pilot signal,
if implemented, Chimera would allow for authentication of both in-phase and
quadrature-phase components of the L1C signal.
Another interesting proposed cryptographic authentication approach is
called Timed Efficient Streamed Loss-Tolerant Authentication (TESLA) [31],
the authentication scheme of which was originally proposed by [32] - [33] for
multicast Internet applications. TESLA utilizes a chain of private keys, which
can be sequentially generated using a one-way hash function f(ki−1) = ki.
A sequence of length N private keys is first generated using the one-way
function f and pre-loaded onto the satellites. The satellites then use each
private key in reverse order (first using key kN , then key kN−1, and so on)
to periodically sign the navigation message with a digital signature, called a
Message Authentication Code (MAC). After digitally signing the navigation
message, at a later time, the satellite also sends the corresponding private
key ki used to generate the MAC, thereby allowing the user to verify the
digital signature. To verify the authenticity of the private key, the user can
utilize the upcoming private key broadcast by the satellites ki−1, and verify
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Figure 1.2: Utilizing the orthogonal encrypted military P(Y) GPS signal for
spoofing detection by cross-correlation with the received signal at a trusted
reference station. Figure adapted from [34].
the private keys are sequential, using the one-way function f(ki−1) = ki. Be-
cause f is designed to be difficult to invertible, an attacker cannot predict
the correct sequence of digital keys in a computationally efficient manner.
Because the currently broadcast civilian navigation messages (L1 C/A,
L2C, and L5) do not use cryptographic techniques, these proposals for mod-
ifying the broadcast satellite signals are largely targeted toward the modern
L1C signal, to be first broadcast on the GPS Block III satellites and allowing
for flexible message types, as well as the Galileo E1 OS signal. However, to
date, these civilian authentication schemes do not currently have plans to be
incorporated in the future navigation signals.
Cryptographic Techniques Leveraging the Current GPS Military Signal
Although the civilian GPS signals do not currently have any encryption avail-
able, orthogonal to the civilian GPS signal lies the military P(Y) GPS signal,
which is encrypted and therefore cannot be generated by a spoofer. As a re-
sult, this signal in the received quadrature channel can be presently utilized
as a type of signature in the background of all authentic GPS signals. Al-
though as civilians we do not have access to the encryption key, we can verify
the presence of the encrypted signal by extracting the received signal from
the quadrature-phase channel and correlating against the corresponding con-
ditioned signal sample from another cross-check receiver, as portrayed in Fig.
1.2. If both devices receive authentic GPS signals, the correlation results in a
strong correlation peak due to the matching encrypted military signal. Oth-
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erwise, if one receiver is spoofed, the orthogonal component of the spoofed
signal lacks a correlation with the authentic P(Y) codes.
This approach of utilizing the encrypted military signal from a trusted
reference station to authenticate the received GPS signal has been proposed
and demonstrated in [35] - [36]. Furthermore, the 20.46 MHz encrypted
military signal can be significantly under-sampled below the Nyquist rate
with a narrow front-end bandwidth, resulting in an attenuated and distorted
vestige of the encrypted signal, which can still be utilized as a signature for
authentication between receivers. In fact, Lo et al. [35] demonstrate this
technique using a 15 MHz sampling rate, and the experiments in [36] - [37]
sample the signal at a rate of 5.714 MHz while additionally utilizing a narrow
front-end bandwidth of 2.5 MHz. Furthermore, our research group’s prior
work has shown that a receiver can be authenticated for GPS spoofing by
using a handful of inexpensive cross-check receivers, which may be unreliable
or potentially also spoofed [38].
1.4 Contribution of Thesis
This thesis presents a multi-receiver spoofing detection approach, which
leverages the widespread nature of these synchronization networks in order
to collaboratively detect a GPS spoofing attack, while simultaneously au-
thenticating all other receivers in the wide-area network. The contributions
of this work can be sub-divided into the following aspects:
1. This work presents a multi-receiver hierarchical communication archi-
tecture, which authenticates the received signal at each PMU in the
widely dispersed network [39, 40, 41].
2. We further defend against a coordinated spoofing attack which targets a
collections of cross-check receivers by generating representative signals
to compare with multiple sub-network sites, while reducing bandwidth
requirements.
3. Additionally, we validate our spoofing detection approach using real-
world GPS spoofing scenarios recorded during a government-sponsored,
live-sky spoofing event, thereby demonstrating our algorithm can suc-
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cessfully evaluate the signal authenticity at each receiver in a widely
dispersed network.
1.5 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organized in the following chapters:
• Chapter 2 provides background on the Global Positioning System (GPS)
as well as processes performed at GPS receivers to acquire and track
the signal to derive a position and timing solution.
• Chapter 3 describes different types of GPS spoofing attacks and out-
lines the steps performed by a stealthy spoofing attack which gradually
commandeers the victim receiver tracking loops.
• Chapter 4 introduces our hierarchical spoofing detection architecture,
provides a high-level overview of the data flow and processing steps of
the algorithm, and assesses the required communication bandwidth.
• Chapter 5 details the complete multi-receiver spoofing detection al-
gorithm, describing the method of conditioning the received signals,
evaluating the signal authenticity among a sub-network of cross-check
receivers, then efficiently verifying the preliminary spoofing detection
by comparing signals on a larger scale, across multiple sub-networks.
• Chapter 6 presents our experimental results and our analysis on the
spoofing statistics, describing our selection of the spoofing detection
thresholds.
• Chapter 7 concludes this thesis and describes future research directions.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND ON GPS
The Global Positioning System (GPS) was originally developed as a utility for
the Department of Defense (DoD) which would continuously provide three-
dimensional, global localization with high accuracy and reliability. To meet
this objective, the key design engineers, Roger L. Easton, Ivan A. Getting,
and Bradford W. Parkinson, developed the following key specifications for
the satellite system [42]:
• Minimum number of 24 satellites in Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) (typi-
cally altitudes between 10000−25000 km) for sufficient global coverage
• 6 orbital planes for inexpensive reconfiguration and station-keeping of
satellites at 55◦ inclination
• L-band carrier frequency (1−2 GHz), since in the 1970s this frequency
band was less occupied and GPS required at least 20 MHz. Addition-
ally, frequencies below 1 GHz have significantly greater ranging error
due to ionospheric refraction, while atmospheric attenuation increases
at higher frequencies
Currently, GPS consists of 31 operational satellites, orbiting at an altitude
of 20, 200 km above the surface of the Earth. In this thesis, we utilize the L1
GPS signal, broadcast at a carrier frequency of fL1 = 1575.42 MHz. In this
frequency band, each GPS satellite broadcasts the legacy civilian signal, L1
C/A, as well as the military P(Y) signal in the orthogonal, quadrature-phase
channel.
2.1 GPS L1 Signal Representation
Both the civilian and military GPS signals have 3 main components, as shown
in Fig. 2.1 and outlined below:
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Figure 2.1: Main components of GPS L1 C/A and L1 P(Y) signals
1. Sinusoidal carrier - an analog, sinusoidal wave at the L1 frequency fL1,
represented simply by the trigonomic functions cos(·) or sin(·). This
component modulates the navigation signal to lie in the allocated L1
frequency band
2. Data signal - a sequence of binary values (±1) modulating the sinu-
soidal carrier. Each satellite transmits the binary signal at the leisurely
pace of 50 data bits, or chips, per second (cps). This signal contains the
navigation data, including the ephemeris for the broadcasting satellite,
which allows the receiver to compute the precise satellite position. The
navigation data signal is completely known, and is identical for both
the civilian and military signals.
3. Spreading code - a high-frequency sequence of binary values modulating
the combined sinusoidal and data signals. The spreading code or pseu-
dorandom noise (PRN) code is a deterministic binary sequence unique
to each GPS satellite and allows each of the 31 operational satellites to
broadcast in the same frequency band without inter-signal interference
through Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA).
With knowledge of the spreading code sequence, the GPS receiver can
access each satellite signal separately. Civilian users have access to the
civilian spreading code, but not the military codes. As a result, the
military GPS signal is encrypted and not usable for non-military users.
The civilian spreading code is 1023 chips long and broadcasts at a rate
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of 1.023 Mcps, thus sending a complete spreading code sequence every
1 ms, whereas the military P(Y) code broadcasts ten times faster, at
10.23 Mcps. Typical civilian GPS front-end receivers have bandwidths
of about 2.0− 10.0 MHz, which is significantly below the Nyquist rate
of the military signals. Correspondingly, the received military signal in
the quadrature-phase component is significantly distorted and attenu-
ated in power.
Mathematically, the received L1 GPS signal from satellite k, can be rep-
resented as [43]:
skL1(t) =A
k
CD
k(t)xkC(t)cos(2pi(fL1 + f
k
Dopp)t+ θ
k)
+ AkYD
k(t)xkY (t)sin(2pi(fL1 + f
k
Dopp)t+ θ
k)
(2.1)
where AkC and A
k
Y represent the amplitudes of the L1 C/A and P(Y) military
signal from the kth satellite respectively, Dk(t) represents the navigation data
signal, xkC(t) and x
k
Y (t) are the L1 C/A code and P(Y) encrypted military
code respectively from satellite PRN k, received at a carrier frequency (fL1 +
fkDopp), where f
k
Dopp is the received Doppler frequency from satellite PRN k.
Finally, θk represents the received carrier phase at time t = 0.
2.2 Processing Steps Performed at GPS Receivers
To interpret the navigation data Dk(t) in Eq. (2.1), the receiver must:
1. Acquire the GPS signals - determine which satellite signals are present
and roughly estimate the received Doppler frequency and spreading
code bit delay, or the code phase τ kcode.
2. Track the GPS signals - continuously maintain a precise estimate of
the signal parameters, including the Doppler carrier frequency fkDopp
and carrier phase θk as well as the spreading code phase τ kcode, which
provides a precise estimate of the satellite time of transmission.
During signal acquisition, the GPS receiver must search through a large
two-dimensional signal space of potential Doppler frequencies of the received
signal fkDopp versus received lags in the spreading code sequence code phases
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τ kcode. The searched spreading code lags range from 0 to 1023 chips while
typical ranges of searched Doppler frequencies are ±6 kHz, depending on
the maximum velocity attained by the GPS receiver for the given applica-
tion. For each examined Doppler frequency value and spreading code lag(
fkDopp, τ
k
code
)
, the receiver generates a signal replica and correlates it with
the incoming signal. In the case that the satellite signal is present with
a similar Doppler frequency and code phase, a large correlation amplitude
results, as graphically shown in Fig. 2.2.
Figure 2.2: GPS acquisition plot. Each value represents the correlation
between the incoming GPS signal and the signal replica having the
corresponding Doppler frequency and code lag (fkDopp, τ
k
code) in the
two-dimensional signal space. A large correlation result indicates the
presence of a GPS signal, with similar Doppler frequency and code lag.
Once the receiver acquires the GPS signal from a particular satellite, it next
tracks the signal and continuously maintains precise parameter estimates of
the received GPS signal, including the precise carrier Doppler frequency,
spreading code Doppler frequency, carrier phase, and spreading code phase
(or lag). These precise estimates are required to retrieve a faithful represen-
tation of the navigation data message Dk(t) as well as to obtain a precise
estimate of the satellite signal time of transmission, which is necessary to
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Figure 2.3: GPS signal tracking loops. The receiver tracking loops correlate
the incoming signal, after down-conversion and digitization, with 6 signal
replicas. The 6 replicas are generated from 2 carrier replicas, which are 90◦
apart in phase, modulated by 3 code replicas, which are equally spaced at
1
2
-chip intervals. Figure adapted from [43].
estimate the satellite range from the receiver.
While tracking a particular satellite signal, the receiver tracking loops cor-
relate the incoming signal, after down-conversion and digitization, with 6
signal replicas, thereby performing 6 correlations, as shown in Fig. 2.3. To
create the signal replicas, the receiver creates 2 carrier replicas: an in-phase
and a quadrature-phase carrier replica, which are 90◦ apart in phase. By
adjusting its carrier frequency estimate, the receiver carrier tracking loops
align the in-phase carrier replica with the incoming signal, in both frequency
and phase, thereby evaluating a precise estimate of the Doppler frequency
fkDopp and carrier phase θ
k for the kth satellite signal.
Similarly, the receiver has 3 replicas of the satellite signal’s binary spread-
ing code. All 3 code replicas are identical binary sequences, separated tempo-
rally in equal 1
2
-chip intervals, and are called Early (E), Prompt (P), and Late
(L). Fig. 2.4 depicts the 1
2
-chip temporal shift between these 3 code replicas
along with the corresponding ideal correlation result below with the incom-
ing GPS signal. By adjusting the code frequency in the delay lock loops, the
receiver attempts to align the prompt code replica with the incoming signal,
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Figure 2.4: GPS signal tracking loops. The receiver tracking loops correlate
the incoming signal, after down-conversion and digitization, with 6 signal
replicas. The 6 replicas are generated from 2 carrier replicas, which are 90◦
apart in phase, modulated by 3 code replicas, which are 1
2
-chip apart.
resulting in the ideal correlation values shown in the triangular correlation
result of Fig. 2.4. With precise alignment during scalar tracking, in addition
to estimating the carrier frequency and phase, the receiver also maintains an
estimate of the code frequency and code phase τ kcode as well.
During tracking, precise signal parameter estimates are required to retrieve
a faithful representation of the navigation data message, represented by Dk(t)
in Eq. (2.1), as well as obtain a precise estimate of the signal time of trans-
mission, which is necessary for estimating the range of the satellite from the
receiver. Once the receiver locks onto a GPS signal and begins tracking, it
no longer examines the larger signal space, but rather initiates the receiver
tracking loops, which continuously maintain the estimated signal parameters
of the time-varying signal. If the receiver loses lock on the GPS signal, the
receiver must again re-acquire the GPS signal in the two-dimensional signal
space and re-instantiate the tracking loops.
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CHAPTER 3
BACKGROUND ON GPS SPOOFING
The civilian GPS signal is not only weak, with received power levels on
the order of 10−16 W, but it is also unencrypted, with a clearly outlined
signal structure in publicly available interface specifications [3]. As a result,
any individual with the right equipment can mimic or spoof the authentic
GPS signals and establish a false position and/or timing solution at a victim
receiver [4]. Spoofing can be performed in different ways, as outlined in
Section 3.2, and more advanced spoofers can conduct an attack without
raising an alarm at the victim receiver, as described in Section 3.3.
3.1 GPS Jamming and Spoofing
GPS spoofing is frequently conflated with GPS jamming, though spoofing
is a much more sophisticated form of attack. During GPS jamming, the
attacker simply broadcasts a high-powered signal in the same frequency band
as GPS, such as a saw-tooth chirp signal around the GPS L1 center frequency
(fL1 = 1575.42 MHz). The jamming signal thereby overpowers the satellite
signals and denies the victim receiver access to the GPS navigation service.
However, spoofing is much more insidious than jamming, since the victim
may not even realize an attack is occurring, being tricked into trusting a
counterfeit navigation solution.
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3.2 Types of GPS Spoofing Attacks
3.2.1 Meaconing
During meaconing, also known as a record-and-replay attack, the attacker
records an authentic GPS signal and re-broadcasts it at a later time. Before
the meaconer can induce the victim receiver to track its false GPS signal,
the attacker must initially force the receiver to lose track of the authentic
GPS signal. This can be done by initially jamming the victim for a sus-
tained period of time, then the attack must broadcast the recorded signal at
a higher power to cause the receiver to adopt the false signal peak upon re-
acquisition. For the victim receiver, this initial jamming is a telltale sign that
an attacker is present and is manipulating the received signal. Furthermore,
because the GPS signal is recorded, the positioning and timing solution at
the victim receiver corresponds to that of the meaconer. As a result, not
only does this limit the false navigation solutions possible, but in the pro-
cess of performing an attack, the meaconer also reveals his own true location.
The next two types of spoofing are more sophisticated forms of attacks in
that the spoofer generates the false GPS signal from scratch.
3.2.2 Data-Level Spoofing
In data-level spoofing, the spoofer provides the victim receiver with false data
bits in the navigation data signal, represented as Dk(t) in Eq. (2.1), which
results in a false positioning and/or timing solution. To induce the victim
receiver to track its navigation solution, the spoofer can steer the receiver
tracking loops away from the authentic signal peak, as described in greater
detail in Section 3.3. After pulling the tracking loops away from the authentic
GPS signal peak, the spoofer can begin broadcasting false navigation data.
Otherwise, the spoofer could additionally broadcast a phase-aligned nulling
signal, also depicted in Fig. 3.1, which allows the receiver to maintain track of
the authentic signal peak while flipping any desired data bits by broadcasting
a matching GPS signal with opposite amplitude, at twice the signal power
[13].
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Figure 3.1: Performing data-level spoofing using a phase-aligned nulling
signal. The nulling signal (in red) is twice the amplitude of the authentic
GPS signals (in green), thus allowing the spoofer to flip any bit in the
navigation data in order to create a counterfeit solution.
3.2.3 Signal-Level Spoofing
During a signal-level (or measurement) spoofing attack, the spoofer manipu-
lates the navigation solution of the victim receiver by gaining control of the
receiver tracking loops as described in Section 3.3, and then modifying the
timing of the GPS signal peak in order to cause a false navigation solution
at the victim receiver .
Considering the resources available to PMUs in the power grid network,
this type of attack is the most difficult to detect for this application. In
particular, the externally provided satellite ephemeris allows for detection
of data-level spoofing attacks. Additionally, the access to a relatively stable
backup timing source (drift rates of 1 µs every 1 − 8 hours for an oven-
controlled crystal oscillator [44]), as well as the stationary nature of the PMU
receivers, with physical security protections implemented around the power
grid substations [45], allows for detection of any timing discontinuities and
alternate position solutions induced by meaconing attacks. As a result, this
work and the experimental results primarily focus on detecting signal-level
spoofing attacks, although Section 5.5 discusses an algorithm for detecting
meaconing.
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Figure 3.2: Steps performed by spoofer to drag receiver tracking loops away
from the authentic GPS signal peak [13]. Red dots indicate points of
reference for receiver tracking loops.
3.3 Conducting a GPS Spoofing Attack
Several research studies have sought to characterize GPS spoofing attacks
[13], [46] as a first step in order to develop better detection techniques. In
particular, once the attacker creates a false GPS signal according to the GPS-
ICD, the spoofer must effectively induce the victim receiver to lock onto the
spoofed signal. If executed properly, the spoofer can in fact do this without
raising alarm at the victim receiver. In order to perform a stealthy attack,
the spoofer must gradually commandeer the victim receiver tracking loops,
as depicted in Fig. 3.2, and perform the following steps:
1. Send a signal which matches the authentic GPS signal received includ-
ing signal parameters estimated during tracking, including the Doppler
frequency fkDopp and code lag τ
k
code.
2. Increase the signal power beyond that of the authentic signal. At this
point, the spoofer has commandeered the tracking loops.
3. Gradually deviate the tracking loops away from the authentic GPS
signal peak in the two-dimensional signal space. This can be done
by gradually modifying the signal Doppler frequency fkDopp and/or the
spreading code lag τ kcode.
4. Broadcast any desired, counterfeit GPS signal, now that the receiver is
successfully tracking the spoofed signal.
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CHAPTER 4
MULTI-RECEIVER COMMUNICATION
ARCHITECTURE
Our proposed communication structure between PMU stations is through
a hierarchical network architecture, with subsets of receivers organized into
sub-networks, which connect to other sub-networks in a distributed manner.
This architecture will utilize the future, large-scale power grid communi-
cation network. Although the protocol and structure of the communication
network for the future Smart Grid have not been specified, one widely consid-
ered proposed structure was designed by the North American Synchrophasor
Initiative (NASPI), and is called NASPInet. NASPI is a government-funded
organization seeking to enhance the efficiency and reliability of the future,
modernized power grid by installing a large-scale network of PMU monitor-
ing stations throughout the power grid network [47]. The communication
architecture proposed by NASPI for the power grid network is described in
Section 4.1; however, because the future Smart Grid communication struc-
ture is yet to be decided, the hierarchical framework presented in this thesis
is designed to be flexible and independent of the underlying communication
network structure.
4.1 NASPInet
The North American Synchrophasor Initiative network (NASPInet) is a pro-
posed standardized communication infrastructure designed to allow commu-
nication of PMU data throughout the power grid network in an efficient and
secure manner. This architecture was designed to be decentralized as well as
expandable, in order to easily incorporate more devices as the measurement
network grows [48]. Fig. 4.1 shows the conceptual architecture of NASPInet.
In the NASPInet framework [49], each PMU transmits its data to a Pha-
sor Data Concentrator (PDC) or another data collection entity, which then
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Figure 4.1: NASPInet communication architecture network [48]
sends the aggregated data to various applications, represented by the Apps
blocks in Fig. 4.1. Applications include system visualization, fault detection,
phasor-data-enhanced state estimation, as well as data archiving. Data which
can be further examined for post-event analysis and for future research and
development is similarly recorded for those applications as Historical Data.
For each utility, a Phasor Gateway unit subscribes to the PMU data within
the utility. Phasor Gateways govern the secure communication of collected
synchrophasor data throughout the network, which is connected via the
NASPInet Data Bus [48]. NASPInet, and other interconnected communi-
cation networks for the U.S. power grid, are designed to securely transmit
wide-area synchrophasor measurements in order to increase system visibility,
detect stresses within the grid, and improve operations of the power grid
system [50].
4.2 Hierarchical Architecture Framework
Utilizing the large-scale communication network established for the future
power grid, our hierarchical architecture will be composed of a large-scale
distributed network of central processing stations or central decision-making
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Figure 4.2: Proposed hierarchical architecture framework
units (CDMU), each of which branches out to a collection of PMU devices in
a centralized manner. This hierarchical structure between the PMU devices
is illustrated in Fig. 4.2. For increased reliability in spoofing detection,
the PMU devices in each sub-network should ideally be widely dispersed
across the power grid network, as further described in Section 6.2. The
CDMU receives signal samples from all receivers in its own sub-network.
To continuously authenticate the received GPS signal, conditioned signal
samples must be regularly provided for each satellite PRN. See Section 5.1
for details on the signal conditioning process.
As shown in Fig. 4.3, upon receiving the GPS signal fragments from its
sub-network of PMU devices, the CDMU conditions and performs pairwise
cross-correlations between each pair of signal fragments, then aggregates the
results to determine the preliminary spoofing decision. After comparing
amongst the given sub-network in the first step, the CDMUs in contact then
compare their respective signal fragments to verify the preliminary spoofing
decision, particularly to detect a more sophisticated, coordinated spoofing
attack against the individual sub-network.
To reduce bandwidth and processing requirements in this second step, the
CDMU creates a sub-network representative signal from the GPS signals ini-
tially evaluated to be authentic within the sub-network and sends copies to
other CDMUs in the distributed network. Upon receiving the representative
signals from other sub-network sites, the CDMU performs a second authen-
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Figure 4.3: High-level process diagram of spoofing detection algorithm,
focused on a single CDMU
tication step to determine the final spoofing decision, which is returned to
each PMU in the individual sub-network. With this two-step hierarchy and
with the generation of representative signals, we allow for a large number of
received GPS signals to be compared throughout the network, while reducing
on processing requirements.
4.3 Data Format Considerations
The conditioned signal fragments for each satellite PRN could be generated
at each PMU, then subsequently sent to the CDMU; however, this would
require a significant amount of available bandwidth. In particular, for a
desired rate of signal authentication, represented by fcheck Hz, a signal sample
length of Tsnip seconds, recorded at a sampling period of Ts seconds and a
data resolution of nres bits per sample, the required bandwidth W when the
receiver observes N satellite PRNs can be represented as
W = fcheck ·N · Tsnip
Ts
· nres (4.1)
By sending pre-conditioned GPS signal fragments, this would allow for less
processing required at the CDMU. However, to reduce bandwidth usage and
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eliminate processing requirements for participating receivers, a single raw
GPS signal sample could be sent, along with the corresponding signal track-
ing parameters, to allow the CDMU to generate the corresponding condi-
tioned signal fragments.
Additionally, at a particular time of transmission, the corresponding signal
from each satellite PRN is received at varying times at each PMU station.
Thus, to ensure the received signal samples from multiple PMU stations align
over a time span of Tsnip seconds, the PMUs must send slightly longer signal
fragments. The temporal increase in sample length typically corresponds
to approximately 20 ms, which is an insignificant increase in data length
compared to the signal fragment lengths which typically provide strong signal
peaks in our investigation. We denote this additional extension in the length
of the conditioned signal as Text. Furthermore, to generate the representative
signals for each sub-network to perform the second authentication step for
algorithm, we must precisely align the signals from multiple PMU stations.
Thus, although the signal fragments sent from each PMU can be initially
coarsely aligned with respect to the transmission time of interest, a slightly
longer signal sample should be sent corresponding to this margin of error.
An estimate of Doppler frequency and carrier phase is computed for each
scalar tracking interval τtrack, leading to a total set of
(
Tsnip
τtrack
)
signal param-
eters for the GPS signal fragment. As a result, the alternative format for the
data sent from a PMU station to the CDMU has the following bandwidth
requirement:
W = fcheck
([(
Tsnip + Text + 2δtalign
)
Ts
· nres
]
+N ·
[(
Tsnip
τtrack
)(
nfreq + nphase
)
+ nindex
]) (4.2)
where δtalign represents the temporal alignment error from the desired time
of transmission, and nfreq, nphase, and nindex represent the data size in bits for
the Doppler frequency, carrier phase, and starting indices for each satellite
PRN, respectively.
In Eq. (4.2), the second additive term in the parentheses is significantly
smaller than the first, largely due to the reduced number of data values re-
quired for the signal parameters, corresponding to only one set per tracking
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period τtrack. As a result, the bandwidth requirement for this alternative
data format does not significantly increase with the number of visible PRNs
and is comparable to the bandwidth requirement for sending conditioned
signal fragments for a single PRN at the same data resolution and authenti-
cation rate. Numerical values for the bandwidth used for our application are
computed and further discussed in Section 6.1.
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CHAPTER 5
SPOOFING DETECTION ALGORITHM
To continuously authenticate the received GPS signal at each PMU station,
we require the signal samples to be regularly transmitted from each device to
the central processing station. For each packet of transmitted data, the PMU
station sends the raw GPS signal fragment, along with the estimated signal
parameters computed during signal tracking for each visible satellite PRN.
From these signal parameters, the CDMU must first generate a conditioned
signal sample for each received satellite signal, in order to compare these
conditioned signal samples for signal-level spoofing detection.
The components of the algorithm defined in this section are presented
in the context of our proposed hierarchical framework. However, the steps
sequentially outlined in the algorithm, including signal conditioning, gen-
erating a pairwise statistic for each pair of receivers, then aggregating the
results to evaluate the cumulative spoofing statistic, can be performed in any
multi-receiver application with a shared communication network.
5.1 Generation of Conditioned Signal Fragments at
Each Receiver
At a particular PMU station, the received L1 GPS signal from the kth satellite
PRN can be represented as [43]:
skL1(t) =A
k
C,L1D
k(t)xkC,L1(t)cos(2pi(fL1 + f
k
Dopp)t+ θ
k
L1)
+ AkY,L1D
k(t)xkY,L1(t)sin(2pi(fL1 + f
k
Dopp)t+ θ
k
L1)
(5.1)
where AkC,L1 and A
k
Y,L1 represent the amplitudes of the L1 C/A and P(Y)
military signal from the kth satellite PRN respectively, Dk(t) represents the
navigation data signal, xkC,L1(t) and x
k
Y,L1(t) are the L1 C/A code and P(Y)
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encrypted military code respectively from satellite PRN k, received at a
carrier frequency (fL1+f
k
Dopp), where fL1 is the L1 carrier frequency of 1.57542
GHz and fkDopp is the received Doppler frequency from satellite PRN k, with
the received carrier phase θkL1 at time t = 0.
After down-conversion by the receiver front-end to an intermediate fre-
quency fIF , the received analog signal is discretized by sampling at a rate of
fs. We denote this down-converted, discretized version of the signal as s
k
L1[t],
represented as:
skL1[t] =A
k
C,L1D
k[t]xkC,L1[t]cos(2pi(fIF + f
k
Dopp)t+ θ
k
L1)
+ AkY,L1D
k[t]xkY,L1[t]sin(2pi(fIF + f
k
Dopp)t+ θ
k
L1)
(5.2)
At this point, the receiver can determine the precise time of transmission of
the received signal from satellite PRN k by using the GPS time of week and
the elapsed number of C/A code chips. The receiver thus obtains a received
signal sample of length Tsnip according to this satellite time of transmission,
for which the military P(Y) signal in the quadrature-phase channel should
be identical and well-aligned amongst all authentic receivers.
Because the length of the signal sample Tsnip exceeds the scalar tracking
integration period τtrack, the PMU sends an array of the estimated Doppler
frequency and carrier phase values, corresponding to the time interval the
signal fragment elapses. Thus, the CDMU uses each set of signal parameters
to generate a fraction of the carrier signal replica which corresponds to that
particular scalar tracking time interval.
From the ith scalar tracking estimates for the Doppler frequency fˆkDopp[i]
and carrier phase φˆk[i] for the kth received PRN, the CDMU generates a
quadrature-phase replica of the corresponding carrier signal, similarly dis-
cretized to the sampling rate fs. We assume that the 180
◦ phase ambiguity
due to the unknown navigation data bit polarity has been resolved for the
received signal. From these estimates, the corresponding quadrature-phase
carrier replica can be represented as [42]:
skreplica,i[t] = −sin
(
2pi
(
fIF + fˆ
k
Dopp[i]
)
t+ φˆk[i]
)
(5.3)
where t ∈ [i · τtrack, (i + 1) · τtrack) in discrete increments corresponding to
the sampling period Ts = 1/fs.
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A total of M =
(
Tsnip
τtrack
)
fractional quadrature-phase replica signals are
generated. The CDMU then concatenates these signal segments to create
the complete carrier replica of temporal length Tsnip:
skreplica[t] =
[
skreplica,1[t] . . . s
k
replica,M [t]
]
(5.4)
Once this replica is generated, the CDMU wipes off the carrier signal by
multiplying the down-converted, digitized L1 signal sample skL1[t] with the
concatenated carrier replica from Eq. (5.4). At this point, assuming the track-
ing loops have converged to the received in-phase signal, the encrypted P(Y)
signal lies in the quadrature-phase channel component, which the CDMU
stores as the conditioned GPS signal fragment for the kth visible PRN from
the rth PMU receiver in the given sub-network. The conditioned signal sam-
ple mr,k[t] for receiver r and satellite signal k can be evaluated as:
mr,k[t] = s
k
L1[t] · skreplica[t] (5.5)
5.2 Authentication within the PMU Sub-Network
In this section, we outline the initial authentication step within the lower-
level PMU sub-networks in the hierarchical architecture. In this sub-network
authentication, as depicted in Fig. 5.1, we perform pairwise cross-correlations
between each pair of receivers {(ri, rj) : i 6= j} in the sub-network for each
satellite signal k. From each correlation result, we evaluate the pairwise
statistic γrirj ,k, before aggregating these statistics for each satellite PRN at
a given receiver, then again aggregating across all received satellite signals,
in order to determine the authenticity of the GPS signal received at the cor-
responding PMU station. The signals which are preliminarily determined
to be authentic are then utilized to create a representative, authentic GPS
signal for that PMU sub-network to be compared with other sub-networks
in the hierarchical structure. Section 5.3 explains in greater detail how rep-
resentative signals are created for each PMU sub-network for each satellite
PRN.
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Figure 5.1: Authentication within a PMU sub-network
5.2.1 Cross-correlating between Matching PRNs
Once all signal samples from the given sub-network have been received and
conditioned for a particular, desired time of transmission to authenticate, the
CDMU performs pairwise cross-correlations between conditioned GPS signal
fragments from matching PRNs:
Crirj ,k[τ ] =
Tsnip∑
t=0
mri,k[t]mrj ,k[t+ τ ] (5.6)
where mri,k and mrj ,k represent the conditioned signal fragments for receivers
ri and rj for PRN k. From this cross-correlation, the CDMU takes the value
with the largest magnitude within a central range of indices, as represented
in Eq. (5.7)
prirj ,k = max
(
Crirj ,k[t] · 1
{
t ∈ [−δtalign,+δtalign]
})
(5.7)
where δtalign corresponds to the alignment accuracy between signals from
the sub-network of PMUs. The GPS signal fragments are closely aligned
according to a specific satellite time of transmission, which is determined
during signal tracking. Thus the alignment accuracy δtalign is dependent on
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the quality of signal tracking at the corresponding pair of receivers, and will
be correct to the nearest sample under typical scalar tracking conditions. By
searching the correlation result within the narrow range of |t| < δtalign, we
ensure detection of an authentic signal peak, if present, while also quickly
seeking the signal peak by computing and checking a small number of corre-
lation lag times.
5.2.2 Evaluating the Pairwise Statistic
As in our previous work [39], we next compute the pairwise statistic γrirj ,k,
which represents the similarity and quality of the received quadrature-phase
channels, which contain the military P(Y) codes, between the pair of receivers
ri and rj, for satellite PRN k. :
γrirj ,k = wrirj ,k ·Brirj ,k (5.8)
where Brirj ,k is a binary voting parameter, voting 1 if the correlation peak
prirj ,k lies above a pairwise spoofing threshold βpair, indicating a strong corre-
lation result with likely matching quadrature-phase signals between receivers
ri and rj for PRN k. Similarly, if the correlation peak lies below the pairwise
spoofing threshold βpair, Brirj ,k votes 0, indicating poor quadrature-phase
signal matching between the pair of receivers. The weighting constant wrirj ,k
is defined as
wrirj ,k = fsignal(ri, rj, k) · fdist(ri, rj) (5.9)
where fsignal(ri, rj, k) > 0 reflects the received signal quality in the resulting
pairwise correlation, with a greater signal strength corresponding to a larger
weight. Similarly, fdist(ri, rj) reflects the relative distance between the two
receivers in the pairwise statistic, with a greater distance corresponding to a
larger weight, since receivers which are farther apart spatially are less likely to
both be spoofed by the same transmitting antenna. This weighting function
is positive when i 6= j.
In this work, we define fsignal to be the peak-to-noise ratio, or the ratio
between the signal peak power and the noise floor power, computed from the
30
cross-correlation of the receiver pair:
fsignal = PNR
(
Crirj ,k[t]
)
(5.10)
=
p2rirj ,k
V ar(Czrirj ,k[t])
(5.11)
where Czrirj ,k[t] represents the pairwise cross-correlation, with the observed
main signal peak set to zero, to avoid including the large signal peak when
characterizing the background noise variance.
Similarly, we define fdist(ri, rj) to be monotonically increasing as a function
of the relative distance between receivers ri and rj with a monotonically de-
creasing, positive derivative. At a relative distance of 0 meters, fdist(rirj) also
equals 0 and the weight asymptotically reaches a value of 1 as the distance
becomes arbitrarily large.
5.2.3 Aggregating across the Sub-Network
After evaluating the pairwise statistics, we compute the statistical contribu-
tion of PRN k to the overall preliminary spoofing statistic of each receiver
in the network:
Ari,k =
∑
∀j 6=i
γrirj ,k (5.12)
The statistical contribution of PRN k, denoted as Ari,k, reflects the similarity
of the quadrature signal component of receiver ri with that of other receivers
in the given sub-network for PRN k.
Given that the satellite ephemerides are available via external channels,
the spoofer must modify the pseudoranges from each received satellite, rather
than the navigation data, in order to induce a false timing solution. Addi-
tionally, given the externally provided ephemerides as well as the well-known,
stationary position of the PMUs, if the spoofer chooses to spoof only a subset
of signals in view, without altering the PMU’s 3D position solution, then the
pseudorange residuals would be inconsistent between satellites, making the
attack trivial to detect using standard RAIM techniques. Given that this
initial consistency check has been performed, we thereby assume all GPS
signals are consistently authentic or consistently spoofed, and thus aggre-
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gate the statistical contributions of all visible satellite PRNs for receiver ri
to form its preliminary spoofing statistic:
Ari =
kN∑
k=k1
Ari,k (5.13)
where N is the number of visible PRNs at receiver ri and {k1, . . . , kN} is the
corresponding PRN list. From the preliminary spoofing statistic, we evaluate
the preliminary spoofing decision Sˆri by checking if Ari exceeds a threshold
αprelim:
Sˆri = 1
{
Ari ≥ αprelim
}
(5.14)
where the threshold αprelim is chosen to satisfy a desired false-alarm prob-
ability, as determined during initialization of receiver ri where an empirical
probability density function is developed under non-spoofed, authentic sig-
nal conditions. By performing this computation for all receivers in the given
sub-network, we finish evaluating the preliminary spoofing decision for each
PMU.
We next collect the receivers preliminarily determined to be authentic
according to Eq. (5.14). Large preliminary spoofing statistics, above the
threshold αprelim, for this collection of receivers indicate a strong match of
the quadrature signal component for the GPS signal received at these sta-
tions. This is likely due to the presence of the authentic P(Y) code in the
quadrature channel of each signal, especially if the receivers are reasonably
separated from each other in distance; however, similarly large preliminary
statistics could also be induced during a sophisticated, coordinated spoofing
attack against these receivers in the given sub-network.
5.3 Formation of Representative GPS Signals for the
Given PMU Sub-Network
To determine the final spoofing decision for the preliminarily authenticated
receivers, we compare the matching quadrature-phase signal received at these
stations with signals from other sub-network sites, via the distributed com-
munication network between CDMUs. Rather than sending copies of all
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conditioned GPS signal fragments initially determined to be authentic, the
CDMU can send one representative signal for each PRN.
This representative signal provides a condensed representation of the pre-
liminarily authenticated signals from the given sub-network, thereby signif-
icantly reducing the bandwidth requirement for the distributed communi-
cation between CDMUs. Furthermore, the processing load at each CDMU
for the second authentication step will correspondingly be reduced, leading
to a shorter delay in determining the final spoofing decision for each PMU
station.
5.3.1 Finely Aligning Authentic Signal Fragments
Before combining the authentic signals to create a representative signal for
the sub-network, the authentic samples must be finely aligned to the nearest
sample. To align the signal fragments received between a pair of receivers ri
and rj for PRN k, we obtain the peak index of the cross-correlation between
this pair of receivers, using the method described in subsection 5.2.1. The
temporal shift corresponding to this index offset can be represented as:
τrirj ,k =
1
fs
· arg max
t
(
Crirj ,k[t] · 1
{
t ∈ [−δtalign,+δtalign]
})
(5.15)
where fs is the sampling frequency of the received signals. In this respect,
we shift the GPS signal fragments from receiver rj relative to the signal frag-
ment from receiver ri by the time difference τrirj ,k, in order to align the two
conditioned signals for PRN k. As discussed in Section 4.3, because the tem-
poral shift can be as large as the worst-case alignment precision of δtalign,
each PMU provides the CDMU with a slightly longer raw signal fragment.
An additional 2δtalign seconds of data is transmitted to ensure a final, repre-
sentative signal fragment of Tsnip seconds can be generated for the received
signal from each satellite.
This alignment process repeats for each of the other initially authenticated
receivers in the given sub-network, by similarly shifting each signal fragment
to align with the sample from receiver ri. The receiver referenced for this
collective signal alignment process, denoted as ri, is chosen arbitrarily from
the collection of authentic receivers. At this point, all preliminarily authenti-
cated quadrature-phase signal fragments are mutually, finely aligned in time.
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5.3.2 Generating Representative GPS Signals for a Given
Sub-Network of PMU Devices
With all of the initially authenticated signal fragments collectively aligned to
the nearest index, we next perform a weighted summation of these signals to
generate a representative signal fragment for the sub-network of PMUs. For
the kth commonly received satellite PRN signal, the corresponding aligned
signal fragment from each receiver rj is weighted by the statistical contribu-
tion Arj ,k, as defined in Eq. (5.12). This quantity Arj ,k represents the ability
to verify the authenticity of the signal received from the kth satellite PRN at
receiver rj, based on the similarity of its quadrature signal component with
other receivers in the given sub-network. The weighted signals from each
authenticated receiver rj are then directly summed together and normalized
to generate the representative signal sample for the local network ni:
mrepni,k[t] =
∑
∀rj Arj ,km
aligned
rj ,k
[t]∑
∀rj Arj ,k
(5.16)
By normalizing the signal, we ensure that the representative signal mrepni,k
maintains the same overall signal strength as the signal fragments from indi-
vidual receivers within the sub-network ni. Additional methods of developing
a P(Y) signal estimate from a collection of quadrature-phase signal samples
can be utilized by extending the linear interpolation approach presented for
a receiver pair in [37].
5.4 Evaluation of the Final Spoofing Decision
Once the representative signal for the sub-network has been generated for
each commonly received satellite PRN, the CDMU sends copies of the repre-
sentative signal to other sub-network sites via the distributed communication
links. Fig. 5.2 depicts the final authentication step at the higher, sub-network
level within the hierarchical framework. Once the CDMU receives represen-
tative signal samples from other sub-network sites, the CDMU then compares
these representative signals from the other sub-networks with its own repre-
sentative signal as well as with the original signal fragments from receivers
that were preliminarily determined to be spoofed. Assuming a majority of
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Figure 5.2: Final authentication step utilizing external, representative GPS
signal fragments from other sub-network sites
the PMUs are not spoofed via a synchronized, coordinated attack, a strong
match of the representative signal with the other sub-network sites confirms
that these initially authenticated receivers are indeed authentic, whereas a
poor signal match would lead to the conclusion that the sub-network collec-
tion of receivers have been spoofed in a coordinated manner. Similarly, with
the signal from the receiver(s) initially determined to be spoofed, a strong
signal match with the representative signals from the other sub-network sites
would lead to the conclusion that the signal is indeed authentic. Otherwise,
a poor signal match would confirm the lack of authenticity of the received
signal.
It is important to note that for our algorithm we assume coordinated at-
tacks do not scale to incorporate a majority of the PMUs in the North Amer-
ican continental power grid network. In such a large-scale attack, our algo-
rithm would be unsuccessful in detection. Indeed, a widespread coordinated
attack on the continental network of PMU receivers would require extensive
resources, including a network of at least several hundreds of transmitters,
broadcasting spoofing signals in a synchronized manner.
Thus, for the kth satellite in common between the two PMU sub-networks,
the CDMU cross-correlates each received, representative signal mrepnj ,k[t] from
sub-network nj with its own representative copy, denoted as m
rep
ni,k
[t], as well
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as with the original signal fragments from each receiver rq determined initially
to be spoofed, denoted as mrq ,k[t]:
Cninj ,k[t] =
Tsnip∑
τ=0
mrepni,k[t] m
rep
nj ,k
[t+ τ ] (5.17)
Crqnj ,k[t] =
Tsnip∑
τ=0
mrq ,k[t] m
rep
nj ,k
[t+ τ ] (5.18)
From each cross-correlation result Cninj ,k and Crqnj ,k, the CDMU computes
the centralized signal peak using Eq. (5.7) and subsequently the peak-to-noise
ratio, which can be represented as
ηninj ,k = PNR
(
Cninj ,k[t]
)
(5.19)
ηrqnj ,k = PNR
(
Crqnj ,k[t]
)
(5.20)
where PNR(·) is defined in Eq. (5.11). The quantity ηninj ,k represents the
quality of the signal match between the local representative signal with the
representative signal from sub-network nj for PRN k. In the same manner,
ηrqnj ,k quantifies the degree of similarity between the representative signal
from sub-network nj and the signal from receiver rq, which was initially deter-
mined to be spoofed when comparing within its sub-network of receivers. A
sufficiently strong peak-to-noise ratio indicates a match with the correspond-
ing sub-network site. Similar to the steps in subsection 5.2.3, the computed
peak-to-noise ratio is aggregated for the correlation results of all received
satellite PRNs and all sub-network available for comparison:
B˜ni =
∑
∀nj 6=ni
∑
∀k
ηninj ,k (5.21)
B˜rq =
∑
∀nj 6=ni
∑
∀k
ηrqnj ,k (5.22)
After aggregating across all PRNs, the CDMU smooths the secondary with
a narrow moving average filter of width ν samples to reduce variability in
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the final statistic:
Bni [t] =
1
ν
t∑
τ=t−ν
B˜ni [τ ] (5.23)
Brq [t] =
1
ν
t∑
τ=t−ν
B˜rq [τ ] (5.24)
Next, to determine the final spoofing decision Sni of the collection of prelim-
inarily authenticated receivers, we verify the secondary cumulative statistic
Bni lies above a threshold αPNR chosen to satisfy a desired false-alarm prob-
ability, similar to the method of choosing the preliminary threshold αprelim
as described in subsection 5.2.3. The secondary cumulative statistic Brq is
similarly compared with the threshold to determine the final spoofing deci-
sion Srq for each of the receivers determined initially to be spoofed, where a
decision of 1 corresponds to an authentic spoofing decision and 0 corresponds
to a spoofed decision:
Sni = 1
{
Bni ≥ αPNR
}
(5.25)
Srq = 1
{
Brq ≥ αPNR
}
(5.26)
5.5 Detection during Meaconing
Because true GPS signals are recorded to perform meaconing, the authentic
P(Y) encrypted codes will be present in the quadrature-phase channel of
the received signal. As a result, a strong correlation peak will be observed,
indicating the original signal was indeed transmitted from the true GPS
satellites. To detect an anomalous time-delay induced by meaconing, the
GPS receiver must have access to another timing source for reference. Indeed,
the PMUs in the power grid also have a backup inertial clock, which is
periodically maintained by the GPS receiver to avoid long-term drift.
Through the use of Position-Information Aiding [39], we can utilize the
known location of the stationary PMUs, as well as the satellite ephemeris
data provided via external sources to compare the relative received times of
the GPS signal between stations within the power grid network. Utilizing this
methodology, we incorporate this technique in the context of this hierarchical
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architecture framework.
The CDMU only needs to perform a meaconing check for receivers in the
subset of PMUs nj which has been authenticated for signal-level spoofing,
as determined by evaluating the final spoofing decision Snj using Eq. (5.26).
Thus to authenticate the received satellite signals for a particular time of
transmission tTx, each authenticated receiver ri sends the CDMU its esti-
mated received time tˆRri,k for the transmitted signal from each visible satellite
k. The CDMU could also send these estimates, obtained from each receiver
in its own sub-network, to other sub-network sites. This would in turn pro-
vide more timing reference data, and thus increased redundancy, while using
negligible additional bandwidth.
After obtaining the estimated received time from all receivers in its sub-
network, the CDMU computes for each pair of receivers (ri, rj) the estimated
difference in received times for the signal transmitted from satellite PRN k:
δˆtrirj ,k = tˆ
R
ri,k
− tˆRrj ,k (5.27)
This estimated received time difference δˆtrirj ,k is then compared with the
expected received time difference δtrirj ,k, computed from the relative known
positions of the receivers ri and rj as well as satellite PRN k. Addition-
ally, the expected received time difference incorporates estimated delays due
to ionospheric and tropospheric effects. Using a similar approach as with
the signal-level spoofing detection algorithm, we first determine a pairwise
meaconing statistic γmeacrirj ,k between receivers ri and rj for PRN k:
γmeacrirj ,k = wrirj ,k · 1
{|δˆtrirj ,k − δtrirj ,k| < τRpair} (5.28)
where τRpair is the pairwise threshold for the deviation of the measured relative
time delay from our computed expectation of the relative delay, and wrirj ,k is
defined in Eq. (5.9). Then, for a particular receiver ri, we similarly aggregate
the pairwise statistic across all receiver pairs and visible satellites, to compute
the resulting meaconing statistic Ameacri :
Ameacri =
kN∑
k=k1
∑
∀j 6=i
γmeacrirj ,k (5.29)
where N is the number of visible PRNs from receiver ri, with the correspond-
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ing PRN list {k1, . . . , kN}. This meaconing statistic is similarly compared
with a threshold to determine the meaconing decision [39].
5.6 Detection during Data-level Spoofing
During data-level spoofing, if the attacker first steers the receiver tracking
loops away from the authentic signal peak, the quadrature channel of the
tracked signal will no longer contain the encrypted P(Y) military signal,
thereby causing our algorithm presented in Sections 5.1 - 5.4 to flag the at-
tack. If the attacker does not manipulate the tracking loops of the receiver,
and instead performs nulling to modify the navigation data bits in real-time,
the encrypted P(Y) codes would indeed still lie in the quadrature channel
of the tracked signal. However, because the satellite ephemeris data is pro-
vided to the PMU externally through secured communication networks, this
alternate method of attack would also still be readily detected.
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CHAPTER 6
EXPERIMENTATION
6.1 Experimental Setup
To verify our spoofing detection algorithm, we recorded GPS signals during
a live-sky spoofing event in a western U.S. state. Simultaneously, we also
recorded data at several other sites, including three sites in the United States
as well as three sites in South America. Our authentic cross-checking receiver
sites are listed below:
1. Urbana, IL, USA
2. Boulder, CO, USA
3. Cleveland, OH, USA
4. Lima, Peru
5. Pachon, Chile
6. Tololo, Chile
At each site, we used a sampling frequency of 2.5 MHz, which is signifi-
cantly below the Nyquist rate for the 20.46 MHz bandwidth military signal.
We additionally utilized a 32-bit data resolution for the spoofed station and
the Illinois station, while for the other receiver sites, we used an 8-bit data res-
olution. Each station was equipped with a Universal Software-Defined Radio
(USRP-N210), connected to a Novatel GPS antenna and triggered by a Chip-
Scale Atomic Clock (CSAC). Fig. 6.1 shows our rooftop antenna setup in
Urbana, Illinois, USA. The collected raw GPS data was later post-processed
using our research group’s object-oriented, software-defined receiver written
in Python, called PyGNSS [51].
40
Figure 6.1: Rooftop antenna setup in Urbana, Illinois
For our experimentation, we used 500-ms-long signal fragments and a
scalar tracking interval of 1 ms. Additionally, we represented the Doppler
frequency and carrier phase signal parameters with 8-byte floats. We also
used a 4-byte unsigned integer to represent the starting index for each re-
ceived PRN signal within the raw GPS signal fragment. These data size
parameters are defined in Section 4.3 in more detail. Thus with 6 PRNs
visible, according to Eq. (4.2), the condensed data format would require less
than 50 kB to represent the tracked signal parameters and about 1300 kB
to represent the extended raw signal for our application, with an 8-bit data
resolution. This is comparable to sending a conditioned signal fragment for
a single PRN at the same data resolution, which requires 1250 kB according
to Eq. (4.1).
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Figure 6.2: Hierarchical network setup with receiver stations
Organizing the receivers above into a hierarchical architecture as depicted
in Fig. 6.2, we define the following two sub-networks: one with the North
American receiver sites and another with the South American sites.
6.2 Examples of Cross-Correlation Plots
When cross-correlating conditioned signal fragments between two authen-
tic receivers, we typically observe a single, large, centralized signal peak.
Fig. 6.3a shows an example of a typical cross-correlation plot between two
authentic receivers.
Within the South American sub-network, we occasionally observed side
peaks in the complete cross-correlation results between the receivers in Tololo,
Chile and Pachon, Chile, an example of which is shown in Fig. 6.4. By align-
ing the conditioned signals using the satellite time of transmission, rather
than the received time and expected relative delay with respect to other
PMU stations, we were able to narrowly pick out the cross-correlation peak
result as shown in Fig. 6.4.
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(a) Authentic conditions (between receivers in Colorado and Ohio)
(b) During spoofing (between receivers in Western U.S. and Ohio)
Figure 6.3: Typical cross-correlation plots between a pair of receivers
during authentic signal conditions, between receivers in Ohio and Colorado,
as well as during spoofing, between receivers in Ohio and the Western U.S.
(spoofed). When both received signals are authentic, we observe a distinct,
central correlation peak; otherwise, if one receiver is spoofed, we observe
the lack of a correlation peak lying significantly above the noise floor.
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Figure 6.4: Example of authentic cross-correlation result with induced side
correlations. Due to the aligned signals, according to the received time of
transmission, and due to the authenticity of the two receivers, we still
observe a distinct, central correlation peak. The induced side peaks are
caused by the similar received Doppler frequencies of the satellite signal
between the two stations, which correspondingly leads to a small difference
in the residual frequencies of the two conditioned signals. To prevent these
induced correlation side peaks, we require receivers in each sub-network to
be well separated.
Due to the relatively close proximity of these receivers, the side correla-
tions are likely due to similar received Doppler frequencies for the satellite
signal at the two stations. In particular, if the residual frequencies in the
conditioned signal are similar enough to be within the discrete Fourier trans-
form frequency resolution fs/Nsamp of each other, where Nsamp represents
the number of samples in the conditioned signal fragment, the signal corre-
lation would thereby introduce the side peaks observed in Fig. 6.4. Similar
correlation effects were observed and noted by [37] between two receivers in
Ithaca, New York, where the authors similarly concluded the correlations to
be induced by the similar received Doppler frequencies. In [37], the authors
consider and describe additional scenarios where spurious correlations could
be induced between a pair of receivers.
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6.3 Evaluating Preliminary Spoofing Decision
Examining 140 seconds of spoofed GPS data, with an authentication rate
of 2 Hz, we computed the preliminary statistic as defined in Eq. (5.13) for
each receiver in the two sub-networks. Considering the preliminary statistics
from the authentic receivers, as well as from the spoofed receiver, we ob-
serve that these statistics come from two separate, right-skewed probability
distributions, as plotted in Fig. 6.5.
(a) Spoofed preliminary statistics
(b) Authentic preliminary statistics
Figure 6.5: Evaluating preliminary statistics over 140 seconds of GPS data
during spoofing shows authentic and spoofed preliminary statistics which
come from two separate right-skewed probability distributions.
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To fit the preliminary statistics with a probability distribution, we search
among the family of generalized gamma distribution functions, which is a
flexible probability distribution function incorporating various different fam-
ilies of skewed probability distributions, including the following well-known
distributions: exponential, chi-squared and gamma, Weibull, and Rayleigh.
The generalized gamma distribution function takes the following form:
f(x, α, c, β, l) =
|c|ycα−1exp(−yc)
γ(α)
y = β(x− l) (6.1)
where γ(·) represents the gamma function: γ(α) = (α−1)!. For the authentic
preliminary statistics, the distribution fit had the following characteristic
parameters:
α = 27.2, c = 0.517, β = 1.82, l = 486
whereas for the spoofed preliminary statistics, the distribution fit had pa-
rameters:
α = 11.3 c = 0.370, β = 0.346, l = 0
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Figure 6.6: Preliminary threshold chosen to meet a specified false alarm
probability, here shown for PF = 0.01, with corresponding probability of
missed detection of PM = 0.03. If the preliminary statistic lies above the
threshold, we determine the receiver is more likely to be authentic;
otherwise, we conclude it is more likely to be spoofed.
Using the authentic spoofing statistic distribution, we can apply a Neyman-
Pearson problem approach to correspondingly choose our preliminary and
secondary thresholds given a false alarm probability rate requirement P reqF .
Choosing our false alarm probability to be on the order of 10−2 at PF =
0.01, we can subsequently define the threshold, as shown in Fig. 6.6, which
corresponds to a probability of missed detection of PM = 0.03. Thus, if our
computed preliminary statistic lies above the threshold, we conclude that
the receiver is authentic; otherwise, if it lies below, we conclude that it is
spoofed.
Applying our preliminary threshold on a separate, 20-second segment of
data during spoofing, in Fig. 6.7a, the cumulative statistic for the western
U.S. receiver in the western United States, which was spoofed, lies below
the threshold by a significant margin, whereas the statistic for the authentic
receivers consistently remained above. Similarly in Fig. 6.7b, for the South
American receiver network, all three stations had measurements which sim-
ilarly remained significantly above the threshold.
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(a) North American Sub-Network
(b) South American Sub-Network
Figure 6.7: Cumulative statistic for North American and South American
sub-networks. For the authentic receivers, the statistic was consistently
significantly above the threshold, thus allowing for an accurate preliminary
spoofing decision. In comparison, the statistic for the western U.S. receiver
was consistently below the threshold, indicating a “spoofed” preliminary
spoofing decision for this receiver.
6.4 Verifying Preliminary Spoofing Decision using
Representative Signals from Other Sub-Networks
To verify the preliminary spoofing decisions, for each authentication time,
we generate a signal fragment representative of the quadrature-phase signals
obtained by the initially authenticated receivers in the North American sub-
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Figure 6.8: Evaluating secondary statistics over 140 seconds of GPS data
during spoofing shows authentic and spoofed secondary statistics, which
come from two separate right-skewed probability distributions functions.
network (Illinois, Colorado, and Ohio). Then this signal and the original
spoofed signal from the western U.S. receiver are both compared with a rep-
resentative signal fragment from the South American sub-network. For the
secondary statistic computation, we chose our narrow filter window to be 3
samples in width. Similar to the preliminary statistic threshold determina-
tion process, we examine the same 140 seconds of spoofing data and compute
the secondary statistics for both the authentic signal as well as the spoofed
signal. We again observe that these statistics appear to come from two sep-
arate distributions, resembling a gamma distribution function, as plotted in
Fig. 6.8.
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Figure 6.9: Secondary threshold chosen to meet a specified false alarm
probability, here shown for PF = 0.01, with the corresponding probability of
missed detection of PM = 0.002. If the secondary statistic lies above the
threshold, we determine the GPS signal is more likely to be authentic;
otherwise, we conclude it is more likely to be spoofed.
Similarly using the generalized gamma distribution for right-skewed data,
with probability density function expressed in Eq. (6.1), the authentic sec-
ondary statistic had the following distribution parameters:
α = 1.53, c = 1.74, β = 33.7, l = 20.0
whereas the distribution for the spoofed secondary statistics had parameters:
α = 1.18 c = 2.69 β = 5.80 l = 13.7
From the fitted distribution, we similarly choose our secondary threshold ac-
cording to a specified false alarm probability rate requirement, shown for
PF = 0.01 in Fig. 6.9, which corresponds to a missed detection rate of
PM = 0.002. Thus, if our computed secondary statistic lies above the thresh-
old, we determine that the GPS signal is most likely authentic according
to this probability model. Otherwise, if it lies below, we conclude that it
is more likely to be spoofed. Finally, in Fig. 6.10 we apply our secondary
threshold on the same 20-second segment of data during spoofing, which was
separate from the data used to create the probability model. We observe
that with our computed secondary statistics, by comparing with the other
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Figure 6.10: Secondary statistic for North American representative signal
and western U.S. receiver signal, which was computed as the peak-to-noise
ratio from correlation with the South American representative signal for
PRN 26, the only common satellite signal observed between both
sub-networks. We observe that this statistic was significantly above the
threshold between the two representative signals, whereas for the western
U.S. receiver, the statistic was significantly below the threshold, indicating
a poor match with the authenticated receivers in the South American
sub-network.
sub-network sites, we accurately verify the authenticity preliminarily deter-
mined for each receiver. In particular, the signal fragment representative of
the quadrature-phase signal obtained by the initially authenticated receivers
in the North American sub-network (Illinois, Colorado, and Ohio) generates
a significant correlation with the representative signal from the South Amer-
ican sub-network, indicating a match with the other sub-network sites and
confirming that these receivers are indeed authentic. In comparison, the GPS
signal obtained at the Western U.S. receiver has a secondary statistic which
lies below the threshold, indicating a poor match between this receiver with
those from the South American sub-network, confirming that this receiver is
indeed spoofed.
Between the North American and South American sub-networks, the re-
ceivers only observed one common PRN due to the significant separation of
the two sub-networks. Despite the fact that PRN 26 is a lower elevation satel-
lite for all receivers, we were still able to observe distinguishing secondary
statistics.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this thesis, we propose a hierarchical detection framework to detect GPS
spoofing amongst a network of PMUs for the future power grid. Our multi-
receiver approach leverages the geographic diversity and available communi-
cation structure within the power grid network and uses the military P(Y)
code as an verifiable authentic signature which cannot be forged by a spoofer
due to its encryption. Our approach further defends against a more sophisti-
cated, coordinated spoofing attack on a sub-network of cross-check receivers,
while reducing bandwidth and processing requirements by using a condensed,
representative signal sample to compare with other sub-networks.
We additionally test our algorithm on data collected during a government-
sponsored live-sky GPS spoofing event, demonstrating that our algorithm
successfully detects signal manipulation at the victim receiver, while simul-
taneously authenticating the other receivers in the wide-spread network.
For future work, we believe the research in this thesis can be utilized
and extended to produce a multifaceted spoofing detection system for the
power grid network. This multifaceted approach would combine multiple
spoofing detection approaches, including the multi-receiver cross-verification
approach discussed, in order to establish a more reliable spoofing decision
for each receiver. Individual spoofing detection methods, such as clock bias
and signal distortion monitoring, would be beneficial for immediate, local
spoofing detection abilities as well as added redundancy, but these methods
also have significant limitations with regards to the spectrum of detectable
attacks. Indeed, no single method is immune to all forms of GPS spoofing;
therefore, a truly effective solution requires an amalgam of techniques to form
a composite detection strategy.
This research seeks to address a critical vulnerability within the United
States power grid, which lacks protection against even the simplest forms
of GPS spoofing attacks. As GPS, or more generally GNSS, becomes a
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fundamental component of our nation’s advancing critical infrastructure, we
must develop and implement effective countermeasures to secure these vital
sectors against malicious attacks, as well as to maintain the integrity of this
key government asset used world-wide.
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